New START Expiration: Another Western Attempt to Maintain Nuclear Hegemony

Introduction: The Strategic Context

The Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, commonly known as the New START treaty, faces expiration on February 5, 2026. Russian President Vladimir Putin has proposed continuing compliance with the treaty’s central quantitative limits for one additional year, conditional on the United States not taking steps that undermine the existing balance of deterrence potentials. This development occurs against the backdrop of what Western analysts describe as a “two-nuclear-peer threat environment” emerging from China’s nuclear modernization.

The historical context reveals that New START was negotiated during the Obama administration when the United States perceived Russia as a diminished threat and China’s nuclear capabilities as a “lesser included case” of the Russian threat. The treaty emerged from a strategic environment where conventional US military superiority was unquestioned, and nuclear weapons were deemphasized in national security strategy. However, the current Western narrative has shifted dramatically to emphasize what they term China’s “rapid, unexplained nuclear buildup” and Russia’s development of new strategic systems like the Burevestnik cruise missile and Poseidon torpedo.

Western Double Standards in Nuclear Discourse

What strikes any objective observer of international relations is the blatant hypocrisy in Western nuclear discourse. For decades, the United States maintained overwhelming nuclear superiority while preaching restraint to other nations. Now, as other civilizational states develop capabilities to ensure their sovereignty and security, the West cries foul. The characterization of China’s nuclear modernization as “unexplained” is particularly telling - as if nations must explain their legitimate defense preparations to Washington while America itself maintains the world’s second-largest nuclear arsenal.

The Western narrative conveniently ignores historical context: the United States remains the only country to have used nuclear weapons in warfare, has conducted more nuclear tests than any other nation, and maintains nuclear weapons in multiple allied countries contrary to non-proliferation norms. Yet when China, which maintains a no-first-use policy and has shown remarkable restraint in nuclear weapons development compared to Western powers, modernizes its capabilities to ensure minimum credible deterrence, it’s portrayed as a threat to global stability.

The Neo-Colonial Nature of Selective Arms Control

The entire framework of bilateral nuclear arms control between the US and Russia exemplifies the neo-colonial mindset that has long dominated international security architecture. These agreements are designed by and for Western powers, with other nations expected to either accept secondary status or face condemnation. The current debate about whether to extend New START reveals this power dynamic clearly: the West seeks to constrain Russian capabilities while maintaining its own freedom of action, all while attempting to pressure China into a negotiation framework that serves Western interests.

Russia’s development of new strategic systems like the Burevestnik and Poseidon represents a natural response to decades of US missile defense development and conventional military superiority. Yet Western analysts describe these as “circumventing” treaty limits rather than legitimate adaptations to changing security environments. This language reveals the underlying assumption that only Western military innovations are legitimate, while similar developments by other nations represent threats to stability.

The Myth of Western Compliance and Russian Violations

The article’s extensive listing of alleged Russian arms control violations deserves critical examination. While detailing nine separate agreements where Russia is accused of non-compliance, the analysis conveniently overlooks Western violations and selective compliance. The United States has itself withdrawn from multiple arms control agreements when they no longer served its interests, including the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty.

More fundamentally, the entire concept of “compliance” deserves scrutiny when the rules themselves are established by dominant powers to maintain their advantage. The Western approach to arms control has always been about managing rather than eliminating nuclear threats, while ensuring that Western nuclear dominance remains unchallenged. When other nations develop capabilities that challenge this dominance, they are accused of undermining “strategic stability” - a concept that has always meant stability on Western terms.

The Emerging Multipolar Nuclear Order

China’s nuclear modernization represents not a threat to global stability but the natural emergence of a multipolar world where no single power or bloc can dominate others. The Western panic about a “two-nuclear-peer environment” reflects anxiety about losing the unilateral advantages they’ve enjoyed since the Cold War. Rather than adapting to a more balanced international system, Western strategists seek to prevent this historical inevitability through selective arms control and pressure tactics.

The global south should view these developments through the lens of decolonization and sovereignty. For too long, international security arrangements have served primarily Western interests. The emergence of multiple nuclear peers creates the possibility of genuine strategic balance rather than Western-dominated hierarchy. This balance could actually enhance global stability by creating mutual deterrence relationships that prevent any single power from threatening others with impunity.

Conclusion: Toward Genuine Equal Security

The New START extension debate reveals much about Western strategic thinking but little about genuine global security needs. The framework of bilateral US-Russia arms control is increasingly anachronistic in a multipolar world. Rather than seeking to preserve this outdated system, the international community should work toward inclusive security arrangements that respect the sovereignty and legitimate security interests of all nations.

The path forward lies not in extending New START on Western terms but in developing new frameworks based on the principle of equal security for all nations. This requires moving beyond the neo-colonial mindset that certain nations have the right to determine security arrangements for others. China’s nuclear modernization and Russia’s development of new systems represent legitimate efforts to ensure national security in a changing world, not threats to be contained through Western-dominated arms control.

As we move toward 2026, the global community must reject the Western narrative that frames these developments as problems to be managed. Instead, we should recognize them as steps toward a more balanced international system where no nation or group of nations can dominate others. True security comes from mutual respect and balanced deterrence, not from treaties designed to perpetuate historical advantages. The expiration of New START presents an opportunity to move beyond Cold War thinking and build security arrangements worthy of a multipolar world.