The Starlink Scandal: How Western Technology Enables Criminal Networks to Prey Upon the Global South

The Alarming Rise of Transnational Scam Operations

Online scams have evolved from isolated criminal activities into sophisticated industrial-scale operations run by transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) primarily based in Southeast Asia, particularly in Myanmar and Cambodia. The staggering statistics reveal a global crisis: The Global Anti-Scam Alliance estimates that $442 billion USD was lost to scammers globally in 2025, with Americans alone losing $158.3 billion in 2023. The FBI reports a 33% jump in losses from 2023 to 2024, indicating an accelerating threat that transcends borders and jurisdictions.

These criminal enterprises have established industrial-style scam centers in regions with limited governance capacity, often co-opting local elites for protection. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimates there are hundreds of such facilities across Southeast Asia, representing a shift from traditional illicit activities like drug trafficking to low-risk, high-reward online fraud. These operations specifically target vulnerable populations worldwide, leveraging digital infrastructure to reach victims across continents.

The Technological Adaptation: Starlink as Criminal Enabler

As authorities in Thailand began cracking down on cross-border electricity and internet access to disrupt these criminal networks, the TCOs demonstrated remarkable adaptability. Evidence emerged in early 2025 that scam compounds in Myanmar started utilizing Starlink satellite internet to bypass traditional internet cuts. Thailand’s National Broadcasting Telecommunications Commission had been reviewing mobile towers along the border since May 2024, and by February 2025, cut cross-border internet access to five key zones hosting scam centers.

The response from criminal networks was swift and technologically sophisticated. According to data from International Justice Mission (IJM), Starlink connections in eight major compounds in Myawaddy and surrounding areas reached 2,492 in April 2025—more than double the number from April 2024. This growth trajectory directly followed Thailand’s actions to block physical connections, demonstrating how Western technology companies inadvertently—or perhaps negligently—enable criminal enterprises.

Western Corporate Complicity and Inadequate Response

The response from SpaceX and the broader Western technological ecosystem has been characteristically inadequate and self-serving. While U.S. Senator Maggie Hassan wrote to Starlink in July urging action, and the Department of Justice issued seizure warrants for Starlink terminals used in scam compounds, SpaceX’s response has been minimal at best. On October 21, 2025, SpaceX’s Vice President of Business Operations indicated they had disabled “more than 2,500 Starlink kits” in Myanmar after equipment was found during a raid. However, reports indicate they missed units operating in KK Park and Deko Park scam compounds.

This pattern of delayed and insufficient response exemplifies the typical Western corporate approach to global south problems: react only when pressured by Western governments or media, provide token solutions, and continue business as usual. The fundamental issue remains unaddressed—profit-driven technology deployment without adequate safeguards or ethical considerations for how these technologies might be weaponized against vulnerable populations.

The Hypocrisy of Selective Technological Governance

What makes this situation particularly galling is the selective application of technological governance. Western nations and companies quickly impose restrictions and sanctions on technologies destined for Global South countries when it serves their geopolitical interests, yet they demonstrate remarkable laxity when their corporate profits are at stake. Starlink and similar satellite internet services operate in a regulatory gray area where accountability is conveniently absent.

The article mentions that “current international space law was developed prior to the widespread development and placement of commercial satellites in low Earth Orbit,” creating a fundamental mismatch between global satellite operations and national regulatory frameworks. This isn’t an oversight—it’s a feature of the Western-dominated technological order that privileges corporate expansion over human security, particularly in developing regions.

The Humanitarian Smokescreen

SpaceX and its defenders often hide behind the humanitarian argument—that satellite internet provides crucial connectivity in remote or underserved areas. While technically true, this argument ignores the corporation’s responsibility to prevent malicious use of its technology. The Myanmar Internet Project indicates that 80 out of 330 cities lack traditional internet access, forcing millions to rely on satellite internet for basic economic services. However, this legitimate need cannot excuse the corporation’s failure to implement robust safeguards against criminal misuse.

This pattern repeats a familiar colonial dynamic: Western corporations enter developing markets under the guise of providing “development” or “connectivity,” while avoiding the responsibilities that come with such technological deployment. They reap profits from both legitimate users and criminal enterprises, then claim neutrality when their technology is weaponized against the very populations they purport to serve.

Toward Accountable Technological Development

The solution requires fundamental shifts in how we conceptualize technology governance and corporate responsibility. Satellite internet providers must establish industry best practices and safeguards to prevent illegal use, including know-your-customer protocols and anomaly detection services. They must prevent diversion of terminals to illicit actors and stymie the growing black market for their equipment.

More importantly, governments and international bodies must close legal gaps concerning satellite services. The Outer Space Treaty establishes that states bear international responsibility for national space activities, including those of private entities, but current frameworks lack mechanisms to ensure satellite operators maintain adequate safeguards against criminal misuse. Organizations like the International Telecommunications Union must advance collective development of technical standards for satellite service accountability.

Conclusion: Technology Justice for the Global South

The Starlink scandal represents more than just criminal adaptation—it symbolizes the ongoing technological colonialism that characterizes North-South relations in the digital age. Western corporations develop and deploy technologies with minimal consideration for how they might disrupt vulnerable societies, then offer token responses when these technologies are inevitably weaponized.

The peoples of Southeast Asia and the broader Global South deserve technological solutions that empower rather than endanger them. They deserve corporate partners who take responsibility for their technologies’ impacts, rather than hiding behind claims of neutrality or humanitarian intent. Most importantly, they deserve a global technological order that prioritizes human security over corporate profits—an order that currently exists only in the privileged West.

Until Western technology companies and their home governments acknowledge their complicity in enabling transnational crime and take meaningful, accountable action, the digital divide will continue to be a security threat for developing nations. The time for empty gestures and performative crackdowns is over; what we need is genuine technological justice that protects the most vulnerable rather than enriching the most powerful.